Digital Twins are representations of real world systems with data exchange between the real system and the synthetic digital representation – with uses in manufacturing (Industry 4.0), and for operational use in aerospace and in civil infrastructure and Government contingency planning. There are many military use cases for Digital Twins that include training, but also test and evaluation, concept development and decision support.
Digital Twins are becoming larger and more complex ‘systems of systems’ with emergent properties appearing from interactions of models and data, making them more difficult to analyse and support. Models and data in the Digital Twin are now often using public and open data sources, cloud based storage and computing resources, and Internet of Things (IOT) devices communicating via the internet; with access to the twin using open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These all provide opportunities for penetration by unfriendly actors in order to disrupt the twin’s operation or reveal unauthorized intimate detail of the real world system being modelled.
Traditionally, military applications use the ‘System High’ approach where dedicated classified networks are used to protect insecure simulation interface protocols for military operations. This cannot be sustained for most civilian Digital Twins and even in defence applications (e.g. operating across the multinational NATO alliance), there is a need to be able to work in situations where the authenticity of data and models cannot be guaranteed. Some military Digital Twins are also likely to need to rely on unsecured public data sources and networks.
In this paper the author proposes a new approach to security and identity in our modelling and simulation systems using an Information Based Security Architecture / Zero Trust Architecture that should be applied to ensure that Digital Twins will operate safely and securely in both military and civilian contexts.