Currently, no empirically validated qualification standard exists for selecting Naval Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operators (Howse, 2011). Some UAS platforms (e.g., Triton, Fire Scout, and Predator) require their operators be winged aviators. This involves a $1 million investment per pilot and years of pilot training, in addition to mandatory, UAS platform-specific training (Cohn, 2012). The Shadow UAS program, on the other hand, uses junior to mid-grade enlisted personnel with no aviation experience. The training program for Shadow pilots is 10 weeks long and approximately a third of the investment (about $347,000) of manned aviators (Cohn, 2012). While adapting a Shadow-like selection/training model could yield significant cost avoidance, thorough research is necessary to develop qualification and training standards that support identification of the most qualified people to operate UAS and who will be most likely to succeed in training and operations (i.e., select the right individuals capable of acquiring these UAS specific skill sets). These differences in standards may be driven more by the relative size and cost of different UAS platforms rather than by empirical comparison of the Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other personal characteristics (KSAOs) underlying performance in each (Howse, 2011). This paper describes differences between KSAOs required to operate manned and unmanned platforms, possible reasons underlying those observed differences, and implications of the observed trends for selection criteria, training requirements, and system design.