The purpose of this paper is to argue that given the constrained fiscal environment that the Department of Defense (DoD) is facing, mid-level policymakers must consider whether training or experimentation objectives can be met with low fidelity models rather than high fidelity simulations. In order to do this, they must understand perhaps the most basic lesson of modeling and simulation (M&S)—the difference between a model and a simulation. The paper will begin with a discussion of the difference between the terms and show they are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably. It will then transition to a case study where the Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL) and the Combat Developments Division (CDD) of the U.S. Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) conducted a short suspense wargame for which a specific simulation was requested (out of a lack of knowledge of other available tools) but the desired endstate was achieved through the use of a low fidelity model. The conclusion is, for some training and experimentation cases, the DoD save significant resources through the use of low fidelity models while still achieving their objectives to standard. On the surface, a simple discussion (tutorial) of the differences between models and simulations would not be worthy of discussion, but under fiscal constraints it is imperative that M&S professionals ensure that policymakers understand the differences and how differentiating between the two may result in a significant savings of resources. The paper will also emphasize the point that selection of the proper tool, be it a model or a simulation, should be based on the experiment or training objectives rather than selecting the tool and then determining which objectives can be achieved. The paper will end with areas for continued research.