The US Air Force Distributed Mission Operations (DMO) Network employs cross domain solutions (CDSs) to isolate simulators within security-defined domains yet still permit inter-team training in a collective synthetic battlespace. The CDS conditions the collective battlespace by blocking, guising, or passing information contained in the network protocol data units (PDUs). Therefore, the various enclaves may experience different representations of the battlespace. One could expect that in an altered battlespace, behaviors and actions of virtual or constructive entities would be distorted because of altered or missing information, thereby affecting the credibility of training activities. Currently, there is no direct means to judge the training integrity of the conditioned battlespace. Current judgments are subjective, a priori opinions rendered by subject matter experts, usually from the perspective of the protected enclave.

There are several factors which hinder progress in aiding or supplementing judgments of training suitability of collective battlespaces which are altered or incomplete. This paper builds upon previous work by the authors and others regarding DMO cross domain solutions. It characterizes the problem more completely and presents a framework for describing the impact of altered and incomplete information to training integrity. The utility of the framework is that it provides more quantifiable measures for assessing potential training impacts of a conditioned battlespace. It could also be used to improve the development of CDS software as well as aid the security community in creating content for Security Classification Guides that is useful for simulator and simulation activities.