U.S. Department of Defense directive 3000.05 established stability operations as a core competency for the U.S. military. The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual 3-07 develops the doctrine and establishes stability operations as one of the three basic operations carried out by U.S. forces (in addition to offensive and defensive operations). The mission that coalition forces are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan depends upon their skills in conducting stability operations. Lt. General Stanley McChrystal has emphasized that it is not the combat skills and weapons of the troops that will determine who will win in Afghanistan, but rather the Afghan people. Unlike more traditional missions such as attack or defend, this mission requires skills for collaboration and transition of responsibilities as opposed to skills for dominating a situation. These skills imply different knowledge and aptitudes.

This paper draws upon examples from the authors' work in less-developed countries undergoing various stages of change, from peaceful to conflictual, over the past 30 years. It describes how the lessons learned could be used to structure a training program for stability operations. These lessons learned have been summarized in two reports for the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

In this paper, three broad areas of required knowledge drawn from this report are discussed: constituencies, conditions of the society, and motivations of the multiple constituencies. Similarly, three broad categories of skills are discussed: provision of public goods and services, managing political participation and accountability, and safety/security. For these skills, examples are presented from the report, along with options for achieving results and the tradeoffs that need to be made. We use these examples, tradeoffs, and options to identify potential tasks and conditions for training.