Over a decade ago, Air Combat Command (ACC) recognized Distributed Mission Operations (DMO) could be an invaluable training tool. Until a few years ago though, DMO usage languished and failed to realize the full potential that seemed so clear on paper. In some cases, the simulator technology itself was to blame. Likewise, some warfighters were initially hesitant to embrace DMO, fearing it would inevitably reduce their live fly training time. However, despite the continuous improvements in technology and the grudging acknowledgement that flying hour cuts were a looming reality, DMO still failed to take hold.

ACC eventually realized the problem was not with DMO as much as it was with the training model that ACC was trying to package DMO within. ACC had initially envisioned DMO operating somewhat like a pick-up game of basketball. ACC would provide the court—in this case, the network and simulators—and multiple units would independently connect to conduct a training event. Although this model brought together different platforms within the same event, it did not provide them the training they demanded. In short, no warfighter wanted to participate in DMO if they perceived they were training aids.

In response, ACC turned to the concept of "manned constructive," a dedicated white force cadre trained to replicate any weapon system or agency. These manned constructives took on the role of the training aid, freeing the warfighters to focus on their individualized training objectives.

This paper documents ACC's struggle to promote DMO, its paradigm shift over the last decade, and analyzes how the manned constructive concept is a critical component of a successful DMO program, and how it complements ACC's new model of daily, small-scale DMO training. The results are striking: DMO usage is soaring…now is the time to capture the painful journey of this success story.